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A LEADER WITH FEW FOLLOWERS: 
MAURICE CREASEY AND HIS 
THEOLOGICAL VISION FOR THE 
FUTURE OF QUAKERISM
JoN r. kershNer
Those of us who are interested in contemporary Quaker theological expression, and appropriate means for applying theological 
analysis to the vitality of Quakerism today, are indebted to David 
Johns for his editorial work on the Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 
1912-2004.1 Johns’ effort brings to light an able Quaker theological 
“centrist”2 whose writings would otherwise be inaccessible to most 
scholars, and whose research and influence are under-represented 
among the Quaker thinkers of the second half of the 20th Century. 
Johns’ collection is a helpful corrective to the tendency of scholars 
to look to the first two generations of Quaker insight in the 17th 
Century as the only theological voices with something worthy to say. 
Part five of this collection, titled “Quaker Identity,” contains four 
essays written between 1962 and 1977. In these four essays Creasey 
attempts to name, and correct, what he sees as a theological problem 
present in Britain Yearly Meeting, and then suggest two avenues that 
he believed could guide Quakers through their predicament and into 
a meaningful future, namely, 1) a reinterpretation of the Quaker 
message; and, 2) ecumenism. While Creasey was chiefly writing these 
four essays to Britain Yearly Meeting Quakers, there is much in them 
that applies to Quakers of all stripes today. My review, then, will first 
discuss Creasey’s analysis of the theological problem, followed by 
his suggested pathways for resolution through reinterpretation of 
the Quaker message and ecumenism. I will treat these four essays 
as a whole, a move that seems justified considering Creasey’s final 
essay in this section, “Rethinking Quakerism,” is in many ways a re-
articulation and development of the other three essays, “’Inward’ 
and ‘Outward’: A Study in Early Quaker Language,” “A Frame of 
Reference for Friends,” and “Prospect for Quakerism.”
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i. The Theological ProBlem
Creasey believed that Britain Yearly Meeting in his day lacked 
“a widely shared sense of purpose, a common vision of what the 
Society of Friends exists to be and to do.”3 This organizational and 
ecclesiological question Creasey elsewhere applied anthropologically: 
what does it mean to be human?4 These two interrelated questions - 
the corporate one of, what is the Quaker organizing principle? And 
the anthropological one, what does it mean to be human? - are central 
to the challenges and opportunities Creasey contends Quakers must 
address if they are to be relevant.5 
At the core of these questions of relevancy, Creasey identifies a 
central Quaker theological problem that must be addressed: “the 
central, inescapable Quaker theological problem is that of the relation 
between the general, universal, inward, divine revelatory activity and 
the particular historic revelatory activity focused in Jesus.”6 Creasey 
notes that in the first two generations of Friends a certain linguistic 
and conceptual looseness has done much to muddy the waters and 
is responsible for contemporary misconceptions of the means and 
content of revelation. In a study of the first generation’s usage of 
terms like “Inward” and “Outward,” Creasey notes that Fox and 
others of his generation viewed “Inward” as “obeying the voice of 
God in the deep inner places of responsible personal existence,” and 
a “personal response to the acts of God in history as interpreted and 
transmitted in Scripture.”7 For the first generation of Friends, the 
emphasis on the “inward” appropriation of Truth was to say that the 
heart of faithfulness must be comprehensive and total and reach into 
the deepest crevices of the soul if it were to be real.8 By contrast, the 
“outward” was religion kept at arms length; it was to take the message 
of the Gospel in words, but to know nothing of it in one’s self.9
However, Creasey argues that Robert Barclay and William Penn 
shifted understandings of “inward” and “outward” language in a 
way that minimized the centrality of the historical revelation of Jesus, 
affirmed as core Truth by the first generation. Thus, whereas the first 
generation considered outward/inward language to be the difference 
between a merely formal, conventional knowledge of the Christian 
revelation, and that of a transforming acquaintance with that same 
revelation, in Barclay it came to signify “a contrast between modes of 
revelation, and even a contrast between two distinct organs whereby 
these modes of revelation are respectively received.”10 Creasey notes 
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that based on this development of a dualism between inward/outward 
“it is very difficult to accord any fundamental importance to History 
or to Scripture.”11 
In other words, Creasey argues that Barclay and Penn12 changed 
the way the first generation used “inward” and “outward” language 
to the extent that they viewed the historical revelation of Christ as 
important, but not essential to the faith because the real essence of 
Truth was an “inward” revelation distinct from historical and physical, 
“outward” manifestations.13
The central theological problem of the relationship between the 
universal, inward revelatory activity and the particular, historical 
revelatory activity, though, gets to the core of the questions: “Who are 
the Quakers, and what are they to do?” And, “what does it mean to 
be human in a technological age?” By stating the theological problem 
positively, Creasey identifies the central Quaker affirmation, namely, 
that “every [person] is enlighten[ed] by the divine light of Christ,” 
which “holds together the historically particular emphasis upon Christ 
and the universal concern with every [person]. The tension between 
the two, and the difficulty of maintaining it”14 helps explain the 
events and byways of Quaker history as well as the “wide diversities of 
understanding and emphasis among us today.”15
ii. reiNTerPreTaTioN of The Quaker message
Thus, Creasey is astute to suggest that the central Quaker theological 
problem concerning the nature of revelation, is also the central 
affirmation that must be maintained and reinterpreted into a late 
20th Century context: Creasey states that to the extent that Quakers 
have any prospects, it depends on, first, “whether we as Friends can 
discern the ‘condition’ of the contemporary world.”16  And second, 
“whether we can speak relevantly and credibly to it.”17 And later, 
he stated that the early Quaker synthesis of the historical revelation 
of Christ in a transformative inward encounter, reinterpreted into a 
modern context, had great possibilities for addressing the fundamental 
ecclesioloigcal and anthropological question of the age.18 This act of 
“reinterpretation” was central to Creasey’s analysis of the prospects 
for Quakerism, and an essential means for addressing the tensions 
within Quaker understandings of revelation.
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Creasey’s emphasis on the task of theological reinterpretation is 
at once a strong corrective to those who would seek to relive 17th 
Century Quakerism, while at the same time a refreshing and hopeful 
assessment of what Quakers can offer modern society. In terms of the 
corrective, Creasey is clear that modern Quakers cannot relive the 
fervor of the 1650s, “this way is closed. We cannot do it; we should 
not even try to do it.”19 17th Century Friends lived in a different 
thought-world, they assumed the legitimacy of Christendom, which 
is no longer a tenable assumption for modern Friends and would only 
demonstrate irrelevance.20 
On the other hand, a rethinking, or “re-minting,”21 of the central 
affirmation - of “every [person] being enlightened by the divine light 
of Christ”22 - Creasey believed could offer a fresh expression of hope 
for the world that takes seriously God’s grace and human longings 
for fullness. Thus, Creasey advocates that a rethinking of the central 
affirmation will understand the “Inner Light,” which Creasey notes 
is an “un-Foxian phrase,” not as “a kind of built-in infallibility or 
self-sufficiency, but it is, as the first Friends said, grace - capacity or 
potentiality for responding to encounter and disclosure.”23 That is, 
that the historic revelation of Christ can be known truly and deeply, 
that it is of “universal significance,” that this proclamation is not only 
of “doctrinal and universal ‘extensive’ significance... [but] is also to 
be known in an ‘intensive’ ...inward and experiential manner by each 
person.”24 Doing this re-minting, Creasey argues, will permit Quakers 
to again speak to the condition of modern day seekers who “make 
very little sense of traditional religious concepts and practices, but on 
the other hand are totally disillusioned by any merely materialistic, 
positivistic concept of Man as the only thing there is...  We cannot 
speak to them unless we can get away from the traditional language, 
but we shall have nothing to say to them, unless we know what that 
traditional language means.”25 
iii. ecumeNism 
Perhaps Creasey’s most distinctive contribution to discussions of 
Quaker relevance was his conviction that any Quaker address to the 
problem and prospect of the nature of revelation cannot be done in 
isolation from the Church as a whole. The kind of rethinking that must 
be done, he says, must be done ecumenically because it involves “the 
overarching problem of rethinking the Christian faith and tradition 
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and experience. If you abstract Quakerism from that, and try to re-
think it by itself, I fear that you have nothing worth rethinking.”26 
Rather, he believes this rethinking should occur with others who 
potentially have things of value to say to Quakers and Quakers can 
say to them.27 Creasey believes the Quaker future is bound up with 
the “mysterious, perplexing, infuriating and yet altogether to-be-
thankful-for reality which we call the Church...”28 As David Johns 
has argued in an article on Creasey’s ecumenism in the most recent 
Quaker Religious Thought, Creasey’s understanding of the possibilities 
of ecumenism are intertwined with his ecclesiology, which was open 
to the other, and held loosely to many accepted Quaker forms and 
traditions.29 Thus, Johns argues that Creasey de-centers Quakerism in 
the grand scope of the Church universal, so that his theology of the 
Quaker position in relation to the Church is not “self-referential.”30 
Because Creasey did not think that the Quakerism of the future 
would be an exact replication of the 1650s, but a rethinking of the 
central, universal affirmation, he avoids the pitfalls of “restorationist 
ecclesiologies” that would re-assert early Quaker antagonism to the 
other churches of their day as a “regulative principle” for Quaker 
ecclesiology in the present day, which would head off any prospects 
for ecumenical dialogue at the outset.31 
However, there is a confusion among Quaker ecclesiologies, Creasey 
argues, that hinders ecumenical discussion and, along with it, the hopes 
of addressing the central theological problems confronting Quakers. 
That is, Quakerism is unable, Creasey maintains, to “understand itself 
as a permanent part of the denominational pattern, as the nucleus of 
a purely spiritual and ethical world faith, as the comprehensive and 
permanent pattern of the true Church, and as a temporary corrective 
of certain errors and mistaken emphases which have appeared in the 
Church, but which the Church as a whole is now aware of and well 
on the way to overcoming.”32 Rather, Creasey’s ecumenism takes 
seriously the contributions Quakerism can make to the Church, 
while also holding that a sober self-awareness of some facets of 
Quaker thought might need to be refined by the critical assessment 
of others. This, I think, is precisely the type of “rethinking” that 
Creasey envisioned and on which he hangs Quaker prospects. Johns 
summarizes Creasey’s ecumenism thus: “Friends may be a contrast 
community in terms of practice and theological conviction... however, 
Friends are a contrast community only in an interpretive sense, never 
in an ontological or an eschatological one.”33 Creasey, Johns argues, 
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understood Quakerism to be an important voice in the Church, but 
not the only voice, and not the goal of the Church.34 In this way, Johns 
makes explicit the manner in which Creasey’s ecumenism provided a 
pathway for rethinking the Quaker message in a way that would assert 
its relevance to the fundamental questions of the day.35 
iv. coNclusioN
In conclusion, Johns aptly situates the theological insights of a 
largely marginalized Quaker figure and organizes these insights in 
a way that brings out Creasey’s continuing relevance.36 As a whole, 
Britain Yearly Meeting - and perhaps much of the Quaker world - has 
rejected Creasey’s critical analysis of Quaker tradition and prospects 
for the future. Whether a reader agrees with Creasey’s analysis or 
not, the central theological problem of the balance between the 
inward revelation and the historic revelation remains a pressing issue 
among Britain Yearly Meeting Quakers, and there is perhaps no finer 
articulation of that tension than what is found in Creasey’s writings. 
However, by locating the origination of the theological problem of 
revelation solely within the purview of Quaker history and expression 
I wonder if Creasey missed an occasion to examine the benefits and 
liabilities - if not the inevitability, whether conscious or not - of the 
type of ecumenical engagement he advocated. That is, Creasey tended 
to look at Quakers from their early moments on in monolithic terms, 
as a group that had maintained their theological particularities in a 
way isolated from the outside world. To be fair, Creasey did challenge 
Quakers to engage reflectively with the leading theological voices of 
the day, but not to the extent or depth that might have contextualized 
ongoing Quaker theological debates in light of pressing cultural 
forces.37 Such an implicit understanding of the isolated transmission 
of religious ideas across time must be treated with skepticism. 
In a recent study, for example, Timothy Burdick has demonstrated 
that the broader Fundamentalist-Modernist theological debates in the 
United States of the early 20th Century were played out in microcosm 
in the evangelical Oregon Yearly Meeting.38 In this example, the 
strong lean towards fundamentalism was reflected in the development 
of Bible schools and a crucicentric theology that often neglected social 
manifestations of the gospel in a way similar to other fundamentalist 
denominations.39 Quakers were not immune to the larger cultural and 
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theological winds of their day, but reflected them in the crafting and 
development of their ecclesiology.40
It is worth examining whether liberal Friends, likewise, accom-
modated Quaker theological tradition to the larger social and cultural 
currents that have continuously buffeted Quakerism since its incep-
tion. Such an occurrence should be expected in any religious group, 
and might be just as essential for understanding contemporary reli-
gious expressions as are a study of origins. For example, Rufus Jones 
(1863-1948) embodied the Modernist turn among liberal Friends, 
which remains impactful. Jones described his favored form of religious 
expression, mysticism, as “the type of religion which puts the em-
phasis and immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and 
intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most 
acute, intense, and living stage.”41 In Jones’ definition, mysticism is a 
subjective experience, defined by the human recipient and abstracted 
from historical particularity. While Jones was not shy to claim that 
his idealized version of religious experience was also that of the first 
generation of Quakers,42 on closer examination his view appears a near 
representation of the liberal theological developments prevalent in the 
late 19th Century. The German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834), often called “The Father of Modern Liberal Theology,” 
also placed the essence of religion in the inward, subjective experi-
ence,43 what he described as the realm of “feeling” and “intuition.” 
In fact Schleiermacher rejected any real sense of revelation - in which 
God becomes known “as He is in and for Himself” - as an appropriate 
foundation for religion because, he though, such a revelation could 
not be comprehended.44 If Schleiermacher believed revelation was an 
inadequate basis for religious knowledge, he, like Jones after him, fil-
tered experience of God through human subjectivity: 
The whole religious life consists of two elements, that man 
surrender himself to the Universe and allow himself to be 
influenced by the side of it that is turned towards him is one 
part, and that he transplant this contact which is one definite 
feeling within, and take it up into the inner unity of his life and 
being, is the other. The religious life is nothing else than the 
constant renewal of this proceeding.45
For Schleiermacher, then, the idea of “God” is not rooted in the 
transcendent, or the otherness of a revelation that is given, but 
“is nothing more than the expression of the feeling of absolute 
dependence.”46 Reminiscent of Schleiermacher, Jones reduced 
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religious experience to “awareness” and emphasized the role of human 
“consciousness” in revelation.47 If Oregon Yearly Meeting adopted the 
theological fundamentalism of its day, and Jones adopted elements of 
the liberal theology of his day, it seems consistent to suggest that all 
along its trajectory Quakers have been both inheritors of a theological 
tradition rooted in the 17th Century—as Creasey illustrated—as well 
as of contemporary social and theological climates. Examined from 
that perspective, the task of rethinking British Quakerism that Creasey 
laid out in 197748 should include a form of ecumenical theological 
reflection in an awareness of the influence liberal theology—as 
articulated by Schleiermacher and his interpreters49—has had on 
Quakerism, as well as an appraisal of the critiques of liberal theology 
readily at hand.50 
Creasey demonstrated himself to be an able theologian whose 
contribution and insight have been unfortunately diminished, 
but now helpfully resurrected by Johns. These essays are a crucial 
starting point for renewed, intentional theological engagement in a 
Quaker way. Johns’ collection is recommended as a model of critical 
theological inquiry that both takes seriously the theological legacy of 
one’s tradition and emphasizes the continuing task of re-minting the 
linguistic and conceptual points of one’s faith for a new age.
eNdNoTes
1  Maurice A Creasey, Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 1912-2004: The Social Thought of 
a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011).
2  David Johns, “Maurice Creasey at the Center,” ed. David Johns In Collected Essays of 
Maurice Creasey (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), xvii.
3  Creasey believed that any attempt to make structural changes to Yearly Meeting organi-
zation would have “little real meaning and value unless it proceeds form a clear and 
uniting vision of the Society’s vocation. How can we overhaul our ‘machinery’ unless we 
know what that machinery exists to do?” Maurice A Creasey, “A Frame of Reference for 
Friends,” in Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 1912-2004: The Social Thought of a 
Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 357.
4  Maurice A Creasey, “Prospect for Quakerism,” in Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 
1912-2004: The Social Thought of a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 383–384.
5  Maurice A Creasey, “Rethinking Quakerism,” in Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 
1912-2004: The Social Thought of a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 399.
6  Creasey suggests this central theological problem has three dimensions: First, early 
Quakers placed at the center of their original proclamation a message that modern 
Friends do not need to weaken or abandon, “namely, that there is a saving revelation; 
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there is an approach from the reality to which we give the name God; and that it 
embraces every human being...  That there is such a divine, saving activity seems to me 
absolutely fundamental to anything that can be called Quakerism now or in the future.” 
Second, that the historical Jesus Christ is the divine image that grounds revelation. And 
third, that to be enlightened by the divine light of Christ is a foretaste of what Creasey 
calls, “our ‘Christ destination.’” That is, “Christ is not simply in the past; Christ is not 
complete. The totus christus, the whole Christ, is yet to come. But it will be the same, 
not another. He will never be left behind; he will encounter us all at the end.” These 
three dimensions of the central Quaker theological problem concern the nature of divine 
revelation, and how revelation becomes effectual. Creasey, “Rethinking Quakerism,” 
406-407.
7  Maurice A Creasey, “‘Inward’ and ‘Outward:’ A Study in Early Quaker Language,” in 
Collected Essays of Maurice Creasey, 1912-2004: The Social Thought of a Quaker Thinker, 
ed. David L Johns (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 330.
8  Ibid., 330.
9  Ibid., 330-331.
10 Ibid., 337.
11 Ibid., 337.
12 Creasey argues that, like Barclay, William Penn used inward/outward language to create 
a dualism that downplayed historical revelation.  Thus, for Penn, the story of God’s 
interactions with Israel in the Hebrew scriptures was not that of God drawing near and 
revealing God’s self in a way that would otherwise have remained hidden, “it is seen, 
rather, as a somewhat regrettable intrusion of the inferior ‘outward’ mode of revelation, 
made necessary by the people’s failure to make right use of an already fully available 
‘inward’ mode of revelation.” In terms of the historical Christ, Creasey asserts, Penn 
believed the “Word’s becoming flesh is almost an embarrassment to [Penn] in his apolo-
getic.  Thus he admits that Scripture ‘by that common Figure, or way of speaking 
amongst Men’ often ascribes to the holy humanity of Jesus Christ, as the ‘Thing 
Containing’ that which, in reality, is to be ascribed to the ‘Thing Contained, which was 
the Eternal Power, Wisdom, Life etc.’” Creasey, “‘Inward’ and ‘Outward:’ A Study in 
Early Quaker Language,” 339.
13 Creasey states that: 
“it is one thing to draw attention, as early Friends did, to an ‘inward’ and an ‘out-
ward’ way of apprehending a Revelation which had been, as all agreed, given in 
History.  It is quite another thing to distinguish, within the concept of Revelation, 
two kinds of Revelation, an ‘inward’ kind alleged to be without any essential con-
nection with History, and an ‘outward’ kind, which existence cannot indeed be 
denied and whose valued cannot be minimized from the standpoint of Christian 
faith and experience but which can be accorded only an equivocal and almost mar-
ginal status in religious thought.  And it is still more obviously another thing to 
postulate a ‘separate and distinct’ organ within man, which yet is no part of man’s 
essential being, dependent in no way upon the constitution of man’s mind, whereby 
alone this inward mode or Revelation is to be received.”
Creasey, “‘Inward’ and ‘Outward:’ A Study in Early Quaker Language,” 353.
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31 Ibid.
32 Creasey, “Frame of Reference for Friends,” 370.
33 Johns, “Beyond Quaker Self-Referentiality,” 48.
34 Ibid., 55.
35 That is, in Creasey’s “generous ecumenicity” and the subsequent “dis-locating ecumen-
icity from an exclusive Quaker self-referentiality,” Quaker prospects to balance rightly 
the universal, inward revelation and the particular, historical revelation, are helped sig-
nificantly along by the very fact that it gives meaning and weight to the way Quakers 
articulate their faith, and perhaps most importantly, how Quakers shape, and are shaped 
by the grand sweep of salvation-history, which is in some way evident in the Church. 
Johns, “Beyond Quaker Self-Referentiality,” 46.
36 Indeed, Princeton theologian, Daniel Migliore, cites as the “task of theology” the: 
“freedom and responsibility of the Christian community to inquire about its faith in 
God... [it is] a continuing search for the fullness of the truth of God made known 
in Jesus Christ. Defining the theological task in this way emphasizes that theology is 
not mere repetition of traditional doctrines but a persistent search for the truth to 
which they point and which they only partially and brokenly express. 
Daniel Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding, An Introduction to Christian Theology 
(Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1991), 1.
37 In his essay, “The Creative Center of Quakerism,” Creasey raises the question:
“Do we, in fact, find that the Biblical, philosophical and theological positions in 
relation to which the Quakerism of sixty years ago was interpreted are still entirely 
adequate and satisfying? Have there been no advances in Biblical and theological 
understand in the so-called “post-liberal” period? Do we feel no need to relate out 
traditional Quaker thinking to that of such men as Barth and Brunner, Tillich and 
Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, Buber and de Chardin?” 
Maurice A Creasey, “The Creative Center of Quakerism,” in Collected Essays of Maurice 
Creasey, 1912-2004: The Social Thought of a Quaker Thinker, ed. David L Johns 
(Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), 65.
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41 Rufus Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion (London: Macmillan and co., limited, 1909), 
xv.
42 Rufus Jones, The Later Periods of Quakerism (London: Macmillan and Co., 1921), 33; 
Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, 494.
43 Schleiermacher writes: 
“the common element in all those determinations of self-consciousness which pre-
dominantly express a receptivity affected from some outside quarter is the feeling of 
Dependence. On the other hand, the common element in all those determinations 
which predominantly express spontaneous movement and activity is the feeling of 
Freedom. The former is the case not only because it is by an influence from some 
other quarter that we have come to such a state, but particularly because we could 
not so become except by means of an Other. The latter is the case because in these 
instances an Other is determined by us, and without our spontaneous activity could 
not be so determined.” 
Here, Schleiermacher describes religion as the human reception of an “influence” - 
the “feeling of Dependence” - and in the “spontaneous activity” of the subject - the 
“feeling of Freedom” - that is “determined by us.” This clearly diminishes any sense 
of revelation as divine disclosure given in historical particularity.
Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed by. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. 
Stewart, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1928), 13–14.
44 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 52.
45 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1958), 58.
46 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, 17.
47 Compare Jones’ emphases of “awareness” and “consciousness” with Schleiermacher’s. 
Both men attributed to the human subject the locus and defining interpretation of rev-
elation and all legitimate forms of religious expression:
“The feeling of absolute dependence becomes a clear self-consciousness only as this 
idea comes simultaneously into being.  In this sense it can indeed be said that God 
is given to is in feeling in an original way; and if we speak of an original revelation 
of God to man or in man, the meaning will always be just this, that, along with the 
absolute dependence which characterizes not only man but all temporal existence, 
there is given to man also the immediate self-consciousness of it, which becomes a 
consciousness of God.” 
Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, 17-18; Jones, Studies in Mystical Religion, xv.
48 Creasey, “Rethinking Quakerism,” 393–416.
49 See, for example, Paul Tillich (1886-1965). Tillich, a contemporary of Jones, argued 
that, “Religion, in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is ultimate concern. And 
ultimate concern is manifest in all creative function of the human spirit... Ultimate con-
cern is manifest in the realm of knowledge as the passionate longing for ultimate reality.” 
This definition mitigates the importance of the historical Jesus, and subjects to the realm 
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of perception and experience epistemological grounds for revelation. Paul Tillich, 
Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 7-8.
50 See especially Karl Barth’s (1886-1968) contention that the human person must not set 
theology in relation to itself, but rather religion rests on the fact that God graciously sets 
God’s self in relation to humanity. Barth is here critiquing Schleiermacher and liberal 
theology: 
“[Christian love] is man’s self-giving to God (not for what He can give, nor for the 
sake of some purpose that can be achieved with His help, but for God Himself), and 
his self-giving to his fellow (again, not for what he can give, nor for the sake of some 
purpose, but for the man himself). As this self-giving, the Christian love which is 
from God is man’s response to God’s own love. It is in this way that God loves man. 
He does not seek Himself, let alone anything for Himself, but simply man, man as 
he is and as such, man himself... In this self-giving to man He is God in all His 
freedom and glory. If the love of man, as his response to the fact that God loves him 
in this way, itself consists in his self-giving, this certainly means that there can be no 
more self-love, no more desiring and seeking the freedom and glory of the self.” 
Likewise, Wolfhart Pannenberg (b. 1928) revitalizes the role of time and history in the 
human understanding of religion and revelation: “The very essence of God implies time. 
Only in the future of his Kingdom come will the statement ‘God exists’ prove to be 
definitively true. But then is will be clear that the statement was always true. In this 
impending power the coming God was already the future of the remotest past.” Post-
liberal, narrative theologians like Stanley Hauerwas (b. 1940) have also challenged 
enlightenment foundations of modernism, and reasserted the narrative, covenantal his-
tory of the Bible as an important way to consider revelation and religion. Karl Barth, 
Church Dogmatics II/1( Louisville, KY: W/JKP, 1994), 192; Eberhard Busch, The Great 
Passion: An Introduction to Karl Barth’s Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), 45; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of 
God (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1969), 62. See: Stanley Hauerwas, The 
Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer on Christian Ethics (South Bend, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1991).
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Passion: An Introduction to Karl Barth’s Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2004), 45; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of 
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